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LIABILITY OF PARKING LOT OPERATORS
FOR CAR THEFTS
When a car is stolen from a commercially operated parking lot,
the parking lot operator's liability usually depends on two issues: First,
is the particular transaction a bailment or a lease? Secondly, assum-
ing the transaction is found to be a bailment, is the ever-present sign
or provision printed in the parking ticket which disclaims all liability
for loss or theft of the parked car effective?
The recent case of Nargi v. Parking Associates Corp.' follows the
usual pattern. The plaintiff's car was stolen from a parking lot oper-
ated by the defendant at New York's La Guardia Airport. The plain-
tiff had paid a nominal parking fee to leave his car in any available
place on the defendant's lot. He locked the car and took the keys with
him. The lot itself was fenced on two sides and bounded by a gulley
at the rear. The front of the lot was unfenced and alongside a main
highway, which enabled a thief -to drive a car from the lot over a
small curb and mingle with the traffic on the highway.
The defendant refuted liability for the theft on two grounds. He
claimed the transaction amounted to a mere leasing of space, involv-
ing no duty of due care on his part; and that the parking ticket itself,
which the plaintiff admittedly read, disclaimed all liability arising
from loss or theft.
The court, in a non-jury trial, held for the plaintiff. It found, as
a matter of fact, that sufficient possession and control of the car had
passed to the defendant to constitute a bailment; that the duty of due
care, implicit in a bailment, was violated by the defendant's improper
fencing of the lot; and that the ensuing liability could not be dimin-
ished by the disclaimer of liability in the parking ticket.
2
In drawing the distinction between a lease and a bailment, an
overwhelming majority of the courts have held contrary to the prin-
cipal case. Where the customer simply pays a fee, drives his car to
any available place in the lot, locks the car and takes the key with
him, most courts hold that possession and control of the car, necessary
to constitute a bailment, does not pass to the parking lot operator.3
'36 Misc. 2d 836, 234 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. x962).
2Ibid.
'hompson v. Mobile Light & R.R., 211 Ala. 525, ioi So. 177 (1924); Suits v.
Electric Park Amusement Co., 213 Mo. App. 275, 249 S.W. 656 (1923); Freeman v.
Myers Auto. Service Co., 226 N.C. 736, 40 S.E.2d 365 (1946); Burcham v. Coney
Island, 87 Ohio App. 352, 94 N.E.2d 280 ('949); Giles v. Myers, 62- Ohio L. Abs. 558,
107 N.E.2d 777 (C.P. 1952); Wright v. Sterling Land Co., 157 Pa. Super. 625, 43 A.2d
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In the case of Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n,4 a parking lot op-
erator was found not liable for the theft of the plaintiff's car where
the plaintiff paid a small fee to gain entrance into the defendant's
enclosure, parked his car in a spot selected by himself, and locked
the car, taking the key with him. The court held this to be a lease and
not a bailment on a finding that possession and control of the car
were never turned over to the defendant, but were retained solely by
the car owner. However, where such possession and control are de-
livered to the parking lot operator, the courts have consistently found
a bailment.5 In Samdler v. Commonwealth Station Co.,6 a proprietor
of a parking lot was held liable for the theft of the plaintiff's car where
the plaintiff received a claim check and at the defendant's request left
the keys in his car.
7
The facts of the principal case are strikingly similar to those of the
Lord case, while the result is quite opposite. Clearly, the latter case
is representative of the majority approach, s but support for the hold-
ing in the principal case can be found in Dunham v. City of New
York.9 Dealing with a factual situation very similar to the Lord case
and to the principal case, the Dunham case found that control and pos-
session of the car, sufficient to constitute a bailment, had passed to the
parking lot operator. The court reasoned that such a determination
rested on the entire evidential picture rather than on any single fact,
and that the jury, concerned with such a factual consideration, could
reasonably find either way.10
Once a bailment is established, as in the principal case, there re-
614 (1945); Feay v. Miller, 72 S.D. 185, 31 N.W.2d 328 (1948); Panhandle So. Plains
Fair Ass'n v. Chappel, 142 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 194o).
'95 Okla. 294, 219 Pac. 713 (1923).
1U. Drive 9- Tour Ltd. v. System Auto Parks, Ltd., 28 Cal. App. 2d 782, 71
P.2d 354 (Super. Ct. 1937); Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 64 A.2d 51 (1949);
Lee Tire 8: Rubber Co. v. Dormer, 48 Del. 578, io8 A.2d 168 (1954); Goodyear
Clearwater Mills v. Wheeler, 77 Ga. App. 570, 49 S.E.2d 184 (1948); Marine Ins.
Co. v. Rehm, 177 So. 79 (La. App. 1937); Auto Ins. Co. v. Syndicate Parking Co., 58
Ohio App. 148, 16 N.E.2d 239 (1937).
03o7 Mass. 470, 30 N.E.2d 389 (194o).
'The distinction between a bailment and a lease has often turned on the fol-
lowing factors: leaving the keys in the car at lot attendant's request. Passero v.
Diana Parking Station, 123 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Rochester City Ct. 1953); acceptance of
a parking receipt and leaving the car unlocked: Schwartz v. Felman, 5o Ohio L.
Abs. 222, 79 N.E.2d 355 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947).
'See note 4 supra.
0264 App. Div. 732, 34 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1942).
",It is apparently well settled that the question of whether or not a bailment
was established is one for the fact finding body. Osborn v. Cline, 263 N.Y. 434, 189
N.E. 483 (1934).
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mains the question of whether the bailee may contractually lessen
or completely avoid the ensuing duty of due care imposed upon him."
The court in the principal case had little difficulty in disposing of
this question, for the contractual provision in issue was in direct
conflict with a statute, which provided in part:
"No person who conducts or maintains for hire. .. [a] parking
lot ... may exempt himself from liability for damages for in-
jury to . .. property resulting from the negligence of such per-
son, his agents or employees, in the ... maintenance of such ...
parking lot.., and any agreement so exempting such person
shall be void."'12
Even in the absence of a comparable statute, the courts generally
have found that attempts by a bailee to contract against his own or
his employees' negligence violate public policy and are void. 13 While
recognizing that the right to contract is a fundamental right as well
as a constitutional guarantee,' 4 the courts have, nevertheless, held
that such a right may not and cannot infringe upon the public in-
terest.' 5 This doctrine has often been applied to bailees whose busi-
ness is affected with a public interest,'6 and it is clear that the opera-
tion of a parking lot is affected with a public interest.'7
However, where a particular contract provision is not found vio-
lative of public policy, it will be allowed.' 8 The two provisions that
are most often upheld by the courts are those which stipulate the
value of the article to be bailed'9 and those which define or limit the
"Soutier v. Kaplow, 330 Mass. 448, 115 N.E.-d 149 (1953); Fuelberth v. Splitt-
gerber, 15o Neb. 309, 34 N.W.2d 38o (1948); Diamond v. Foote, log N.Y.S.2d 8,i
(Niagara Falls City Ct. 1952); Starita v. Campbell, 72 R.I. 405, 52 A.2d 303 (1947).
'-N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 89-b.
n1Jersey Ins. Co. v. Syndicate Parking Inc., 50 Ohio L. Abs. 329, 78 N.E.2d 692
(Ct. App. 1948); Atkins v. Racquet Garage Corp., 177 Pa. Super. 94, 110 A.-2d 767
(1955); Baione v. Heavey, 1o3 Pa. Super. 529, 158 At. 181 (1932). See 6 Am. Jur. 270
(1959).
"*U.S. Const. Art. I § io.
"See note 13 supra.
16Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 2o10 Pac. 6o2 (1922); Sil-
vestri v. South Orange Storage Corp., 14 N.J. Super. 205, 81 A.2d 502 (1951); Miller's
Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20o, 65 S.E.2d 341 (1951).
"7 Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Texas Engineering & Mfg. Co., 181 F.2d 923
(5 th Cir. 1950).
TRevenue Aero Club, Inc. v. Alexandria Airport, Inc., 192 Va. 231, 64 S.E.2d
671 (195l); Kravitz v. Parking Serv. Co., 6 Ala. App. 487, 199 So. 727 (1940).
"°In Schoen v. Wallace, 334 Ill. App. 294, 78 N.E.2d 8oi (1948), the plaintiff
sent her mink coat, allegedly valued at $3,5oo, to a furrier for summer storage.
The plaintiff and the defendant furrier stipulated by contract that the value of
the coat was $ioo. Because the plaintiff, who had already insured the coat against
any type of loss, wanted to pay only the minimum rate for storage, the storage
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time during which the bailment is to remain in effect.20 Even these
provisions, however, are subject to certain limitations.
The first limitation is that a bailee cannot bind a bailor by any
contractual provision unless the bailor had notice of such provision.21
The mere retention of a parking receipt does not constitute notice of
the terms written on the receipt.22 The bailor considers a receipt to
be only for purposes of identification, and cannot, therefore, be pre-
sumed to have agreed to anything further.23
The second limitation is that a provision printed in a parking
ticket or on a sign posted in the lot will not be construed more strong-
ly against the bailee. 24 A sign stating that the parking lot will close at
6 p.m. does not, in itself, relieve the bailee of his duty to care for a
car remaining in the lot after such hour, even where the sign is called
to the car owner's attention.25 The courts have held that such a sign
can reasonably be interpreted by the owner of a car to mean -that no
automobiles will be accepted after 6 p.m. and not that the bailee is,
at that hour, relieved of his normal duties.26
Since it seems well established that a bailee cannot contractually
eliminate either the entire or even a substantial portion of that duty
implicit in a bailment,27 his liability will most probably turn on
whether the transaction was a bailment or a lease. This determination,
unlike the extent to which a bailee may contract against his own
negligence, interestingly enough lies in the jury's province.25 It is for
the fact finding body to decide whether sufficient possession and control
passed to the parking lot operator. Given this treatment, the issue is,
as it should be, highly flexible and susceptible to determination either
way, depending on the particular facts.
R. 0. COYLE
rate increasing proportionately with the stipulated value of the coat. The coat dis-
appeared in storage, persumably due to the negligence of the furrier. The court,
without discussing the effect of the stipulation on an insurer's right of subrogation,
limited the plaintiff's recovery to S'oo, holding that it is more against public policy
to allow this plaintiff to recover twice for the same coat than it is to allow the de-
fendant to establish a liquidated limit on his possible damages. Accord, Blinder
v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 1o3 F. Supp. 9o2 (E.D. Ill. 1952).
Lee Tire & Rubber Co. v. Dormer, 48 Del. 578, xo8 A.2d 168 (1954).
2 tManning v. Lamb, 89 A.2d 862 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952); Lucas v. Auto
City Parking Co., 62 A.2d 557 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1948).
Alilen v. Southern Pac. Co., 117 Utah 171, 21 3 P.2d 667 (1950).
23Rappaport v. Storfer Bros. Inc., 207 Misc. 391, 138 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1955); McAshan v. Cavitt, 149 Tex. 147, 229 S.V.2d ioi6 (Tex. 195o).
LLangford v. Nevin, 117 Tex. 13o, 298 S.V. 536 (rex. Comm'n App. 1927).
'5McAshan v. Cavitt, 149 Tex. 147, 229 S.W.2d io6 (Tex. 1950).
wIbid.
-See note 13 supra.
2See note io supra.
